RE: Current status of pending Emergency Motions for Leave to File (Proceed) submitted in United States v. Ware, 04cr1224 (SDNY) (RWS) (ER), (“1224”) and United States v. Ware, 05cr1115 (WHP) (ER), (“1115”), jointly, (the “Moot Cases”). Gross criminal judicial misconduct and judicial corruption by District Judge Edgardo Ramos (SDNY), a material witness regarding material Brady exculpatory evidence, para. 86–87, in SEC v. Honig, 18cv08175 (SDNY) (Ramos, J.), hereinafter, (an “Unindicted Co-conspirator”).

Judge Ramos:

1. Mr. Ware is writing this inquiry regarding the above Moot Cases. As you very well know since you were assigned the matters on July 12, 2021, there were then docketed pending emergency motions, and since you were assigned 1224 and 1115 Mr. Ware has submitted several additional emergency Motions for Leave to Proceed, which have yet to be filed or docketed, to the Court for adjudication, which has yet to occur without any explanation or guidance from the Court except the cryptic Dkt. 307.[1] In particular, Mr. Ware’s motion for a new trial for “flagrant” government misconduct predicated on numerous Brady disclosure violations, Dkt. 263, 267, 272, 276, 291, 296, 299, 300, 303, 305, and undocketed 51A, 51B, 51C, 51D, and 51E are pending and remain unadjudicated by the Court.

2. As the Court is aware purported Leave to File orders, Dkt. 220 (WHP) and Dkt. 160 (RWS) were entered, in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction,” by the previous district judges, who, nevertheless, continued to file and docketed all submissions by Mr. Ware received after the alleged entry of both ultra vires and moot orders. Yet somehow the current Court has seen fit, again, without any explanation or citation to any precedent, to not docket or file any subsequent submissions by Mr. Ware, emergency or otherwise, which is unprecedented and lawlessness at its worst. Notwithstanding no legal reason, other than actual bias, prejudice, and racism, for such violation of the due process of law and denial of access to the court in egregious violation of the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment and the Canons of the Code of Conduct for Federal Judges.[2] See also 18 USC 241 and 242.

Furthermore, the Court has yet to produce any precedent or authority that permits a federal court to impose any purported “Leave to File” requirement in a criminal proceeding that restricts a defendant from enforcing a written Brady disclosure order, see Exhibits 5 and 6, infra. Please provide such precedent and authority if such exist. Mr. Ware and his research team have been unable to locate a single precedent that permits such denial of due process of law.

3. Judge Ramos it appears there is an unseen, covert, force or influence other than the law that is controlling the prompt and mandatory adjudication of the Article III and 18 USC 3231 subject matter jurisdiction of the Court over the Moot Cases, see Dkt. 263, 267, and 303. Controlling Supreme Court precedent, Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 93–95 demands that the Court, before it proceeded to the merits of Dkt. 250 (the Gov’t Section 2044 motion) “first” as a “threshold issue” go no further until the party (i.e., the Government in Dkt. 250) invoking the jurisdiction of the federal court confirms its Article III standing over every element of its claims before the Court is lawfully authorized to grant the moving party any judicial relief. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. That reversible egregious constitutional procedural error was committed by the Court in regard to Dkt. 250, see Dkt. 304 (July 28, 2021, ultra vires order, Ramos, J.).

4. The Government and the Court currently, and has always, lacked all Article III and 18 USC subject matter jurisdiction over the “lawful” element of its claims (Counts I, II, and III) in the 1224 indictment, (the “1224 Indictment”), 18 USC 401(3) criminal contempt[3] claims and factual allegations.

5. As the Court should be aware the purported orders (GX 11 and GX 24) and judgment (GX 7) Mr. Ware was alleged by the Government in Counts I, II, and III, respectively, of the 1224 Indictment to have disobeyed by not drafting, signing, and issuing bogus and fraudulent Rule 144(k) legal opinions to Alpha Capital, AG (Anstalt)[4] and the plaintiffs, (the “Civil Plaintiffs”)[5], named in Alpha Capital, AG, et al., v. IVG Corp., a/k/a Group Management Corp., d/b/a GPMT, et al., 02cv2219 (SDNY), (“2219”) as a matter of law cannot be “lawful[6] orders (GX 11 and GX 24) and judgments (GX 7).[7]

6. Mr. Ware draws the Court’s attention to Exhibit 3, the May 17, 2021, certification by FINRA that each of the 2219 Civil Plaintiffs named in para. 8, Exhibit 2, of the 1224 Indictment “On or around February 2001” were not and have not ever been lawfully registered as brokers or dealers as required by United States law, 15 USC 78o(a)(1), a criminal offense. As a matter of law, ipso facto, per se, the Civil Plaintiffs lacked all Article III and 28 USC 1332(a) diversity standing in “March 2002” to have filed the 2219 lawsuit. Therefore, as a matter of law, Steel Co., Id., and Lujan, Id., the 2219 district court (Sand, J.) lacked all Article III subject matter jurisdiction over the 2219 proceedings to have entered any “lawful” orders (GX 11 and GX 24) and judgment (GX 7). Accordingly, GX 7, GX 11, and GX 24 being unlawful judgments and orders are not within the scope of 18 USC 401(3) which applies only to “lawful” orders and judgments entered by a court having subject matter jurisdiction over its proceedings.[8]

7. Jude Ramos, the 2219 proceedings are null and void ab initio, and moot; and conversely, the 1224 Indictment, proceedings, and judgment of conviction and sentence are null and void ab initio and moot. Steel Co., Id.[9]

8. Ergo, as a matter of law, on or about November 17, 2004, former United States Attorney (SDNY) David N. Kelley lacked all probable cause to seek the 1224 Indictment; and as a matter of law the 1224 district court (Sweet, J.), lacked all Article III and 18 USC 3231 to have entered Dkt. 160 (the purported leave to file order). Moreover, Sweet, J., lacked all lawful Article III and 18 USC 3231 subject matter jurisdiction to enter any judgment of conviction or sentence against Mr. Ware. Therefore, accordingly, all charges in the 1224 Indictment are null and void ab initio, all judgments of conviction and sentence entered by the 1224 Court are null and void ab initio, and regretfully all orders (Dkt. 304 and 307) entered by Ramos, J., are also null and void ab initio, entered in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.”[10]

9. Judge Ramos, given that you “acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction” when you entered Dkt. 304 and Dkt. 307, you now have devastating personal civil monetary liability to Mr. Ware, GPMT, and its successors and assigns. Civil monetary liability is estimated at +$2.25 billion dollars. An amount that will likely cause a personal Chapter 7 liquidation bankruptcy; palpably an intense personal pecuniary interest in the outcome of the proceedings to such an extent Judge Ramos you are statutorily, 28 USC 455(a) and 455(b)(1–5), and constitutionally, see In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136–38 (1952) (no man is permitted to be a judge in his own case, and thus, you cannot adjudicate your own recusal proceeding), judicially disqualified from all prior and subsequent judicial involvement in 1224 and 1115[11].

Judge Ramos, if you would please in the interest of justice, and for good cause, respond to this urgent inquiry regarding the pending Emergency Motions for Leave to Proceed and in regard to the Court’s Article III and 18 USC 3231 subject matter jurisdiction over the 1224 and 1115 proceedings. Please, if the Court would, given that Mr. Ware has, is currently, and will continue to suffer irreparable harm, injury, and damages to his liberty and pecuniary interested unless the Court takes immediate action and adjudicates, if jurisdiction is found, the pending Emergency Motions for Leave to Proceed and other matters.

Sincerely,

/s/ Ulysses T. Ware

_____________________________________

Ulysses T. Ware

via email: The Hon. Chief District Judge Laura Taylor Swain (SDNY)

Acting U.S. Attorney (SDNY) Audrey Strauss

Jeffrey R. Ragsdale, DOJ’s Office of Professional Responsibility

[1] Canon 3A(5). In disposing of matters promptly [Mr. Ware’s pending Emergency Motions for Leave to Proceed and other pending matters], efficiently, and fairly, a judge must demonstrate due regard for the rights of the parties to be heard and to have issues resolved without unnecessary cost or delay. A judge should monitor and supervise cases to reduce or eliminate dilatory practices, avoidable delays, and unnecessary costs. Prompt disposition of the court’s business requires a judge to devote adequate time to judicial duties, to be punctual in attending court and expeditious in determining matters under submission, and to take reasonable measures to ensure that court personnel, litigants, and their lawyers cooperate with the judge to that end. (emphasis added).

[2] Canon 2A. An appearance of impropriety occurs when reasonable minds, with knowledge of all the relevant circumstances disclosed by a reasonable inquiry, would conclude that the judge’s honesty, integrity, impartiality, temperament, or fitness to serve as a judge is impaired. Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct by judges, including harassment and other inappropriate workplace behavior. A judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety. (emphasis added).

[3] 18 USC 401. A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, or both, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as —

(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice;

(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;

(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command. (emphasis added).

[4] See SEC v. Honig, 18cv08175 (SDNY)(Ramos, J.)) at para. 86–87 (Alpha Capital, AG (Anstalt) charged by the SEC for securities fraud for obtaining a bogus and fraudulent Rule 144 legal opinion from an unnamed lawyer and conducting an illegal unregistered public offering of “Company A’s” restricted securities in violation of 15 USC 77e, 77x, and 78ff), (the “Honig Case”). See Exhibit 1.

[5] See para. 8 in the 1224 Indictment. See Exhibit 2.

[6] To have convicted Mr. Ware beyond a reasonable doubt on the “lawful” element in 18 USC 401(3) the Government, at trial, would have had to admit evidence that showed beyond a reasonable doubt that each of the “Civil Plaintiffs” (i) were not unregistered broker-dealers, a legal impossibility given FINRA’s May 17, 2021, certification, Exhibit 3; and (ii) the Civil Plaintiffs were not Section 2(a)(11) statutory underwriters, again a legal impossibility given para. 10.1(iv) of GX-5 (i.e., the Government’s own trial evidence exonerated Mr. Ware of all charges in the 1224 Indictment by judicially admitting, risibly, each 2219 Civil Plaintiff was ineligible for Rule 144(k)). Therefore, as a matter of law, it is a legal impossibility that Mr. Ware was lawfully found guilty of the charges in the 1224 Indictment. Accordingly, Mr. Ware is actually and factually innocent of all charges and the judgment of conviction and sentence must be reversed and vacated null pro tunc, and the 1224 Indictment immediately dismissed with prejudice. See Dkt. 300 (05cr1115 SDNY).

[7] Unregistered broker-dealers, see Exhibit 3, infra, and Section 2(a)(11) statutory underwriters, the 2219 Civil Plaintiffs, see Exhibit 2, infra, as a matter of law are strictly ineligible for any Rule 144 exemption to Section 5 of the 1933 Securities Act, see SEC Release 33–7190 n. 17 (1995). Dkt. 294 (05cr1115 SDNY).

[8] The alleged commands of GX 7, GX 11, and GX 24 were not lawful commands. A federal court does not have the lawful authority to command the civil or criminal violation of federal or state law: It is not an “offense”, 18 USC 3231 subject matter jurisdiction requirement, for Mr. Ware, GPMT’s securities counsel, to not draft, sign, and issue, bogus and fraudulent Rule 144(k) legal opinions to the Civil Plaintiffs, certified unregistered broker-dealers, and 15 USC 77b(a)(11) statutory underwriters, see government trial exhibit para. 10.1(iv) of GX-5 and para. 12 and 13 in the 2219 complaint, strictly legally ineligible for Rule 144 exemption to Section 5 strict-liability registration requirements. See SEC Release 33–7190 n. 17 (1995) and cf., para. 86–87 in the Honig Case, Exhibit 1, infra.

[9] (“Moreover, those statutory arguments, since they are “jurisdictional,” would have to be considered by this Court even though not raised earlier in the litigation-indeed, this Court would have to raise them sua sponte. See Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 278–279 (1977); Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U. S. 449, 453 (1900). The Ninth Circuit has denominated this practice-which it characterizes as “assuming” jurisdiction for the purpose of deciding the merits-the “doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction.” See, e. g., United States v. Troescher, 99 F.3d 933, 934, n. 1 (1996).

We decline to endorse such an approach because it carries the courts beyond the bounds of authorized judicial action and thus offends fundamental principles of separation of powers. This conclusion should come as no surprise, since it is reflected in a long and venerable line of our cases. “Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1869). “On every writ of error or appeal, the first and fundamental question is that of jurisdiction, first, of this court, and then of the court from which the record comes. This question the court is bound to ask and answer for itself, even when not otherwise suggested, and without respect to the relation of the parties to it.” Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, supra, at 453. The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter “spring[s] from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States” and is “inflexible and without exception.” Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379, 382 (1884).”). (emphasis added).

[10] See Stump v. Sparkman, 437 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978) (“ A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’”). (emphasis added). The 2219 civil lawsuit was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice, after the statute of limitation had run on all claims by the “Civil Plaintiffs” on December 20, 2007, Dkt. 90, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 41(a)(2), see Exhibit 4, infra. Thus, “clear[ly],” all jurisdiction was absent over GX 7, GX 11, and GX 24 on July 28, 2021, when the ultra vires and moot Dkt. 304 (Ramos, J.) was entered in 1224 and 1115. A.B. Dick Co. v. Marr, 197 F.2d 498, 501–02 (2d Cir. 1952) (voluntary dismissal of lawsuit by plaintiff annulled, vitiated, and voided all orders, proceedings, and judgments just as if the lawsuit “had never been filed;” terminated the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, and rendered the proceedings moot). (emphasis added).

[11] Judge Ramos is required to immediately vacate all ultra vires orders, Dkt. 304 and 307, entered in 1115 and 1224, recuse himself, and request the Clerk of the Court to reassign 1224 and 1115 to a new district judge.

Exhibit 1

Exhibit 2

Exhibit 3

Exhibit 4

Exhibit 5

Exhibit 6

Financial Engineering Investment Banker